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by Mario Pastore## 
Introduction 
What forces accounted for the rise and fall of coerced indigenous labor 
forms and the eventual predominance of a free mestizo peasantry in colonial 
Paraguay? 
The early colonial economy of Paraguay was characterized by Spanish 
enslavement of American Indians. However, enslavement contributed to 
indigenous depopulation, which led the crown to outlaw indigenous slavery and 
replace it in mid-sixteenth century by two versions of the "encomiendas," a 
form of serfdom. The encomienda "yanacona or originaria,1I disguised aand 
restricted the earlier slaverYi the encomienda "mitaria", on the other hand, 
bore more of a resemblence to European serfdom. "Yanaconas or originarios" 
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lived in the houses, farms, and -later- ranches of their masters, serving them 
continuously in all sorts of tasks. "Mita Indians ll so-called took turns 
rendering their masters specified labor services in shifts whose duration was 
eventually reduced to two months per year. They were -from the 1580's onwards­
increasingly confined to segregated towns, which were first mostly founded by 
Franciscan missionaries. "Town Indians" were also subject to the 
"mandamientos," a state-run contract labor system which rented out indigenous 
laborers to Spaniards for relatively short, specified tasks.l 
Both the bonded and the still free indigenous population had declined 
noticeably by the 1630's and continued to fall thereafter despite entrustement 
and confinement to towns, founded also by Jesuit missionaries after 1610. 
Alongside the relatively larger estates Spaniards now worked with still 
diminishing supplies of both types of encomienda labor, the stagnating 
Franciscan missions and the still struggling Jesuit missions, a progressively 
more important mestizo, guarani-speaking free peasantry began to proliferate. 
Paraguay's encomenderos or would be encomenderos, Jesuit priests, and ­
beginning in the ,1630' s- Brazilian slave raiders competed for indigenous 
laborers, and the resulting political and military conflicts that erupted 
between them characterized the remainder of the seventeenth and the first part 
of the eighteenth centuries. 
The indigenous population of the Jesuit missions began to grow fairly 
rapidly after the middle of the seventeenth century, as it was successively 
freed from the slave raids and the labor services required by the encomienda 
mitaria. That of Franciscan missions -which was subject to the encomiendas­
also began to rise, but much later -as the middle of the eighteenth century 
approached- and comparatively more slowly. Nevertheless, privately held 
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encomiendas did not now regain their past importance, even after large numbers 
of indigenous people became potentially available for entrustment following 
the Jesuits' expulsion in 1767. Private encomiendas increasingly reverted to 
the crown, but remained legal until just after the turn of the century, and in 
practice persisted until the end of the colonial period. 
The free mestizo peasantry also grew in numbers, as a result of 
population growth and the transformation of some former Jesuit mission 
dwellers into peasants. However, after the Bourbons liberalized -in the 1770's 
most notably- international trade restrictions imposed by the Hapsburgs the 
previous century, and immigration increased as well, free land became 
progressively more scarce, the lands of the "pueblos de indios" were 
encroached upon by strangers, and sharecroppers and landless peasants 
appeared. The indigenous towns, unlike the encomienda, were not abolished 
during the colonial period and persisted beyond independence until the middle 
of the nineteenth century. 
Any set of stylized economic facts must be seen through the prism of a 
certain body of economic theory and interpreted in terms of that theory. 
will approach the problem neoclassically, that is, I will attempt to account 
for the stylized facts as behavior arising from constrained maximization. 
Since I seek to explain property rights on laborers and the institutional 
structure that evolved to enforce them, as well as the manner in which one set 
of property rights and enforcement institutions evolved into another, property 
rights will be determined endogenously and changes in property rights will 
results from changes in parameters. However, once a particular set of property 
rights and enforcement institutions have appeared, they become behavioral 
constraints, part of the datum within which agents maximize. More precisely, 
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the rise and decline of indigenous labor coercion will be seen to have 
resulted from the rent-seeking behavior of individuals and the state subject 
to changing relative factor prices and transactions costs constraints. 
The paper is organized as follows: section one describes in more detail 
the evolution of indigenous enslavement, encomiendas, segregated towns, and 
mandamientos, as well as of the mestizo free peasantry. Section two puts 
forth some property-rights and rent-seeking notions that will help 
conceptualize the described phenomena. Section three uses these notions to 
interpret the evidence presented. Section four shows that refutable 
implications derived from the theoretical scheme are consistent with the 
historical record and that historical evidence not utilized to derive the 
theoretical scheme may be interpreted in terms of it without difficulty. 
Section five draws conclusions. 
I. Indigenous Slaves, Serfs, and the Small Free Mestizo Peasantry in Paraguay. 
Pre-Columbian indigenous people of the area with which we are concerned 
commonly practiced slavery and other forms of labor coercion, though in a much 
lower scale than Spaniards subsequently did. Tropical forest dwellers, the 
indigenous people of the Parana-Paraguay river basin were similar in many 
respects to those still living in the Amazon river basin. These wage war not 
for possession of forest land, which is abundant, but for the capture of 
slaves and wives. Groups tend to split once they reach a certain size and, 
rather than fighting over the land, the new groups simply move on to a 
previously unoccupied spot of the forest. Forms of state are very simple. More 
complex forms of state tend to appear where there are "varzeas" (very fertile 
land silted by periodic river floods), because it becomes necessary to exclude 
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competing groups from them. The state then taxes the excluded inland groups 
for the right of access to the fertile river banks. Something similar seems to 
have occurred in the highlands of Mexico and Peru, where more complex forms of 
state and labor coercion also seem to have arisen earlier where the scarcity 
of land first made itself felt.2 
Spaniards did not begin enslave indigenous people of the area 
immediately after arriving. Instead, while they were still seeking to reach 
Peru from the east and southeast they sought to obtain without coercion the 
Indian goods and labor services they needed to attempt the journey. To this 
effect they formed mutually beneficial -though shifting- alliances with the 
guarani-speaking, neolithic Carios of the Asuncion area and against the 
nomadic, more warlike Guaycuru tribes that blocked the westward way and for 
long had harassed the Carios. These alliances were cemented in the customary 
indigenous manner, that is, by trade as well as by the polygamous marital 
unions of Cario women to Spanish men. 3 The Carios valued iron tools highly, 
and quickly substituted them for their own stone instruments. From the 
Spanish-Cario "marriages" arose a mestizo population, about which more will be 
said later and kinship ties between Spaniards Carios, and their mestizot t 
offspring. Kinship had mediated the exchange of voluntary, reciprocal labor 
services among indigenous tribes and the cufiadazgo initially served the same 
purpose for Spaniards and Carios. Particularly important in this connection 
were ties between in-laws which led to the institution of the "cunadazgo. H4 t 
The joint westward military expeditions through the Chaco to Peru 
produced numerous captives that were divided up as slaves among the Spaniards 
and their Cario allies. These expeditions did not only require the support of 
indigenous warriors but had to be outfitted and called for porters as well. 
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Indigenous women became particularly valuable to Spaniards in this connection, 
because they had customarily been responsible for agriculture and other heavy 
chores. Pressed by the need to reach Peru from the east before other 
Peninsulars did so from the west the Spaniards quickly turned the "cufiadazgo ll 
into a vehicle for coercively exacting progressively greater amounts of labor 
from their Cario "relatives, II male and female. They carne to use their "wives" 
as slaves, exchanging them freely among themselves for clothing, horses, etc. 
These increased exactions were responsible for some early indigenous uprisings 
against the Spaniards, among them that of 1539, led by Cario women. 5 
Once Peru was reached from the west, it became clear to Spaniards in the 
River Plate that the eastern route was more costly and would not be used; they 
now turned their energies to extending the conquest and colonization of the 
area around Asunci6n and began to openly raid friendly indigenous communities 
for slaves. It did not appear to matter that mineral resources seemed to be 
lacking and that no commodities suitable for export had yet been found. These 
raids (llmalocas ll or "rancheadas") sought women in particular, for reasons 
already explained, and formally stretched until 1555. 6 Indigenous slaves were 
used domestically and were exported to Sao Vicente, on the Atlantic coast, 
where they were sold to Portuguese sugar cane producers.? The Spaniards' 
former indigenous allies reacted against these raids with a generalized 
resistance (bloodily repressed), and flight, as well as in other ways.8 
Intermarriage with Spaniards, enslavement, resistance, flight, and 
European diseases rapidly lowered the indigenous population, a fact which 
royal officials had expected from previous experience elsewhere in the New 
World. 9 Royal officials pressed to do away with enslavement and to instead 
institute the encomiendas, a system that would protect free indigenous vassals 
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from enslavement and which they finally managed to impose in 1556. That year 
the Provincial governor assigned in encomiendas mitarias 27,000 able-bodied, 
adult males (the equivalent of a population of 100,000) among a fraction of 
the Spaniards in Asuncion. 10 Those who did not receive encomiendas, sorely 
disappointed by what they said was favoritism in their granting, set out for 
other areas where unentrusted indigenous settlements were known to exist, the 
Guaira area east of Asuncion most notably, and where the same process as in 
Asuncion was then repeated. 
The encomienda mitaria required those subject to it to take turns 
providing their masters specified labor services for a period of time that by 
the early seventeenth century had been reduced to two months per year. An 
encomendero was allowed to hold an encomienda grant for the remainder of his 
life and to bequeath it to one, or in very unusual circumstances, two 
consecutive generations of his or her descendants (that is, always less than 
the perpetual grant to which encomenderos aspired). The encomienda was said to 
have become "vacant" at the end of the stipulated period, if the beneficiary 
died without heirs, or if he abandoned the encomienda. A vacant encomienda 
escheated (reverted) to the crown, which could reassign them to other worthy 
Spaniards of its choice if it so desired. 11 The crown could also assign 
encomiendas to the Church or to royal officials in pursuit of public aims. 
"Indios de la mita l1 were also subject to the "congregacion, " a policy 
that involved their resettlement, concentration, and internment in segregated 
towns ("pueblos de indios") to which only encomenderos and a few additional 
persons could have access. 12 These towns were often -though not always­
located near the Spaniards' own towns, and were then referred to as 
"fronteros." Two supervisory layers governed the indigenous population of 
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these towns, one Spanish, the other indigenous. The first layer included the 
temporal supervision of a lay Spanish town overseer and the religious 
supervision of a priest who imparted Catholic instruction to the American 
Indians confined to them. The second layer consisted of a Spanish imposed, 
relatively privileged indigenous hierarchy more elaborate than the one that 
characterized indigenous communities of this area prior to the conquest. 13 
The presence of this hierarchy, conversely, meant that town dwellers enjoyed a 
measure of self government, though its extent was more circumscribed than what 
they had enjoyed in pre-Columbian times. As in the case of Spanish towns, 
indigenous town were governed by "cabildos. 1I Under the direction of both 
supervisory layers, town dwellers were supposed to provide for their own 
sustenance and that of their overseers by laboring collectively on the fairly 
large amounts of land the colonial administration assigned to the towns, 
although these lands were clearly less extensive than those indigenous 
communities had previously roamed over and considered theirs. Town dwellers 
collectively owned the lands with which had been endowed and could not 
alienate them.14 Similarly, town dwellers could only trade with those allowed 
access to the towns, in particular, royal officials and their encomendero(s). 
Entrustment of the indigenous population and its confinement to towns 
could, and did in fact, take place independently of one another, especially in 
the beginning, and the privately undertaken founding of indigenous towns 
eventually became the responsibility of the religious orders. Thus, while the 
first encomiendas were granted in the 1550's and some indigenous towns were 
founded by private Spaniards, the first permanent indigenous towns were not 
founded until the 1580's, by Franciscans missionaries. ls 
"Recalcitrant" indigenous people who had waged war against the Spaniards 
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or who, after 1556, had refused to peacefully submit to entrustment, could be 
forced to do so in "just wars" the Spaniards waged to that effect. These 
slaves were kept under close supervision in the homes and farms of the 
Spaniards and following the first repartimientos in mid-sixteenth century came 
to be regarded as belonging to another encomienda, the encomienda "yanacona," 
later known as the "originaria." 16 Like the encomiendas mitarias, the 
yanaconas or originarias could not legally be traded at will; they had to 
revert to the crown before it reassigned them to another Spaniard. The 
encomienda yanacona thus disguised and prolonged indigenous slavery, but in a 
restricted form, since yanaconas could not legally be sold or rented. In 
practice, however, trades and rentals did take place. 
Apart from the labor services they owed their encomendero under the 
encomienda mitaria, those confined to towns were also subjected to the 
"mandamientos," a state-run system of contract labor by which indigenous 
laborers were rented out to private entrepreneurs who needed them for 
specified tasks of limited duration. Mandamientos furnished Spaniards the 
indigenous laborers they needed to build and man vessels to transport yerba 
mate down river to Asunci6n, as well as for other commercial activities. 
Indigenous laborers received a legally established maximum wage from their 
employers for the tasks they performed under the "mandamientos," but they had 
to turn over half of it to the town's "treasury." The state could also use 
laborers from indigenous towns to build and repair roads, bridges, forts, and 
public buildings. 17 When demand for labor increased, the number of indigenous 
laborers that were sent out under the mandamientos increased as well. Since 
many of those indigenous laborers did not return to their towns of origin the 
population remaining in indigenous towns decreased permanently. The colonial 
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administration appointed a special supervisor ("alcalde de sacas ll ) to enforce 
mandated extraction ceilings and assure that indigenous laborers on 
mandamiento assignments returned to their townS. 18 
The "new" system of the encomiendas did not work well, for reasons that 
contemporaries attributed to the incentive system built-in the encomiendas. 
Specifically mentioned were the facts that the grant was not perpetual, that 
it could only be held for the grantee's lifetime and that of one or two 
generations of their descendants; and that encomenderos could not freely trade 
or rent their encomiendas. Encomenderos shifted indigenous serfs from the 
encomienda mitaria to the encomienda yanacona or exceeded the terms of 
mandamientos, to which end they bribed the Spanish corregidores of indigenous 
towns if necessary. Encomenderos also evaded rendering the military service to 
which their grant obliged them by purchasing government offices conferring 
exemption from that responsibility.19 For these and other reasons the 
indigenous population continued to decline. By the early seventeenth century 
it had been reduced to a fraction of its original size and both forms of the 
encomiendas had declined noticeably, despite the fact that much of the 
indigenous population had been confined to towns. 20 Three successive sets of 
royal ordinances of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries noted 
the abuses and legislated against them. 21 
Real reprieve for the Guarani, however, did not come until after the 
Jesuits began to found missions in the Guaira region east of Asuncion in the 
1610's, with indigenous people already entrusted to Spaniards, a fact which 
later was to serve as the excuse for disputes between Paraguayans and 
Jesuits. 22 However, raids by Portuguese enslavers forced the relocation of 
the original Spanish settlements and Jesuit missions from Guaira to areas 
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farther west and south west l respectively. The displaced Spanish settlements 
moved within the jurisdiction of Asuncion. The Jesuits resettled in an area 
astride the Parana and Uruguay rivers l which became the Jesuit missions t 
IIlocus classicus." The pursuing Portuguese "bandeiras / " however 1 were 
decisively defeated in mid seventeenth century by Jesuit-led indigenous armies 
which the missionaries had trained and furnished with firearms. Between 1660 
and 1680 1 and in recognition of their success t the crown exempted the Jesuit 
missions from the encomienda. 23 Henceforth l the tribute indigenous people 
owed the king was paid by Jesuits not in kind but in cashl which they obtained 
by selling yerba mate in the regional market. InitiallYt Jesuit- supervised 
teams of indigenous laborers gathered yerba mate in far-off royally owned 
lands. However t the operation was very costly in terms of human life. To 
reduce those losses the Jesuits eventually set up plantations in the missionsl 
themselves. 24 Attempts by encomenderos to extend the encomienda to Jesuit 
mission towns, observed at this timet generally failed. 25 Thereafter, the 
indigenous population of Jesuit missions grew despite periodic bouts of the 
plague. 
Outside the Jesuit missions the indigenous population had declined 
notably by the 1630's, and continued to decline thereafter -though more 
slowly- even though by this time it had for the most part been confined to 
towns. Encomenderos can now be observed to attempt to extend the encomiendas 
to mestizos and to introduce African slaves but they were generally1 
unsuccessful, because of legal regulations and the deliberate hindering of the 
colony's export trade t respectively. Only in the mid eighteenth century did 
the indigenous population of Franciscan missions begin to rise, very slowly. 
The remainder of the seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries were 
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marked by economic contraction and absence of immigration. As the indigenous 
people were "reduced" to towns they vacated lands which were occupied in turn 
by family farms of mestizo, guarani-speaking peasant proprietors. Resulting 
conflicts between Paraguayans and Jesuits over indigenous labor came to a head 
in the so-called Comuneros Revolt of the first third of the eighteenth 
century. 
Following the Borbonic liberalization of trade restrictions of the 
1770's in particular, production of yerba mate in the north, tobacco in the 
east, and cattle for the yerba industry in the south and southeast, all 
increased. 26 Correspondingly, the land market became more active: land prices 
rose, land rents, tenant-farming, and landless peasants appeared, and the 
frontier was pushed farther out. 27 There was migration to the more rapidly 
growing yerba and cattle ranching areas of the north from, for example, the 
southern mission towns abandoned by the recently expelled Jesuits as well as 
from among immigrants who had come from outside the Province. 28 Higher 
tobacco output grown typically by the small peasantry as a cash crop and 
initially encouraged by the establishment of the royal tobacco monopoly, led 
to an increase of the small peasantry and, therefore, of the land frontier. 
Furthermore, strangers ("forasteros") increasingly encroached on the lands of 
the pueblos de indios during this period. As land prices rose, wages rose as 
well, partly because the Borbonic reforms encouraged the development of 
manufacturing and agricultural state enterprises whose demand for indigenous 
labor revived a seventeenth century colonial administration policy to grant no 
new encomiendas and force vacant ones to revert to the crown. 29 The greater 
domestic and foreign demand and the greater derived demand for land and labor 
helped expand the land frontier, but it also introduced a certain 
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concentration of land and greater social differentiation among small peasant 
proprietors. 
The system continued to function along these lines for the remainder of 
the colonial period. The Spanish crown finally abolished the encomiendas as a 
legal institution in 1803, and an early national government reiterated their 
abolition in 1812, after Independence. However, the pueblos de indios outlived 
persisted until the middle of the nineteenth century.30 
Now that we have described in detail the phenomena to be explained, let 
us briefly discuss some basic elements of the economic theory of property 
rights and then attempt to substantiate the Introduction's contention that the 
observed forms of property rights on labor and land resulted from public and 
private rent-seeking subject to the constraints of relative factor endowments 
and positive transactions cost. 
II. Property Rights, Factor Proportions, and Public Finances. 
The major questions that need accounting may be conceptualized within a 
property-rights, rent-seeking framework. These questions are, first, the early 
enslavement of indigenous people by Spaniards; second, the indigenous 
depopulation which led to slavery being substituted by the encomienda 
yanaconas or originarias and the encomienda mitaria; the mandamientos; and the 
continued decline of the indigenous population and the encomiendasi third, the 
rise of a free mestizo peasantrYi and fourth, the abolition of serfdom; Let us 
now proceed to discuss the property rights and rent-seeking framework that 
will help us think them. 
In general, scarce resources will generate rents that will accrue to 
their owners so long as property rights are well delineated and enforced. 31 
/ 

14 
On the other hand, should property rights be poorly delineated and/or 
enforced, the resources will be overexploited and the rents that would 
otherwise have accrued to their owners will dissipate along many margins. 32 
The prospect of capturing rents that will otherwise dissipate will provide 
incentives to delineate and enforce property rights over scarce resources. 
Property rights delineation and enforcement will internalize the formerly 
existing externalities. 33 Delineation and enforcement of property rights may 
be carried out by individuals or, if the coercion necessary for enforcement is 
subject to economies of scale, by a specialized institution such as the state, 
which will edge out competing private associations. The state will perform 
these and other functions such as resolving disputes over rights among its 
constituents, defending constituents' rights from outside threats, and solving 
the free rider problem usually entailed here, all in exchange for revenue 
derived from the rents that will accrue to owners of scarce resources. 
All other things equal one would expect to find relatively better 
defined and enforced property rights over comparatively more scarce factors 
for which costs of measuring and monitoring rights are relatively lower. 34 
Conversely, one would expect to find property rights over relatively more 
abundant resources to be comparatively imprecisely delineated or poorly 
enforced, ceteris paribus. Property rights will be comparatively better 
delineated and enforced, therefore, as resources become sufficiently scarce 
relative to the costs of measuring and monitoring rights. This holds for any 
factor of production. Should labor be scarce relative to land, we would expect 
property rights on labor to be better delineated and enforced than property 
rights on land. Conversely, should land be comparatively more scarce vis-a-vis 
labor, we would expect property rights on land to be comparatively more 
I 

16 
reduced to one degree or another: otherwise, the laborer could in 
search of the highest wagei in turn, reducing the freedom of movement of the 
laborer will require his tying to, for example, the land, other men, or a 
combination of both. 37 Labor coercion will, in addition, force the laborers 
off the labor supply curve that would characterize their labor leisure choice 
if this were free, leading laborers to furnish a larger labor input than they 
would have provided voluntarily at every wage rate. 38 The shifted labor 
supply curve retains its positive slope, implying that bonded laborers will 
move along their coerced labor supply curve in response to material 
incentives. We would to observe, therefore, systems of coerced labor to 
include incentive structures to induce laborers to increase effort. Laborers' 
rights to enjoy the material incentives offered them will have to be somehow 
recognized in order for the incentives to have the desired effect. In turn, 
this means that coerced laborers will -in general- have to be capable of 
owning property de facto if not de jure. In turn, this will have several 
implications for the capacity of coerced laborers to accumulate wealth, derive 
an income from it, and spend that income. Whether laborers' right to property 
ownership is legally recognized or the laborer's income is spent on consumer 
goods or on repurchasing his/her freedom need not concern us at this 
Tying laborers will some type of coercion to be applied, which 
implies that an unequal distribution of coercive power must exist between the 
laborers and those who keep them under subjection. Whether the required 
coercion is applied by individuals, the state, or both, its ultimate aim must 
be to appropriate the difference between the marginal product of labor and the 
wage rate that will obtain in what now must be regarded as an imperfectly 
competitive labor market, a monopsonistic labor market to be precise. Should 
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individuals and the state jointly apply the required coercion, one would 
expect to observe some arrangement by which individuals and the state will 
share the benefits of labor coercion. Labor coercion sanctioned by the state, 
therefore, may also be thought of as a public finance system. 39 
State regulation creates economic rents that may raise the rate of 
return to resources above what they would earn under competitive conditions 
and which the state may tax to obtain revenues in excess of what it could have 
collected in an unregulated market. In effect, the state and private 
entrepreneurs share the rents that these regulations create, the division of 
the rents depending on the bargaining power of the parties. Therefore, state 
regulation will be both demanded and supplied. Because rent-creating 
legislation is valuable, private entrepreneurs will spend resources lobbying 
the government for it. Whether contract or predatory, the government will have 
incentives to sell rent-creating government regulation at prices that reflect 
its position as a price discriminating monopolist, because the sale will 
increase government revenues. That both contract and predatory governments may 
be consistent with labor coercion is clear from the historical record of the 
Americas. However, which form ,of government is more likely to sanction labor 
coercion is not as clear. The welfare loss is greater than that implied in the 
standard monopoly analysis, which does not take into account the cost of 
resources devoted by private entreprenerus to lobbying the government or, we 
may add, by the government to price discriminate. 4o Clearly, then, some free 
men benefit more from coercing labor than do others, and they may consequently 
be expected to feel differently towards the regulatory system required to keep 
slavery in place, attitude which one would expect to somehow be reflected in 
their political opinions and activities regarding the role of the state in 
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preserving or abolishing labor coercion. 
Now, for there to be incentives to more precisely define property rights 
on laborers in agricultural settings in particular, labor must be relatively 
scarce vis-a-vis land or, conversely, land must be abundant by contrast with 
labor, which is why agricultural labor coercion is generally associated with 
relative land abundance. 41 Relative land abundance, however, is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for the rise of some form of labor 
coercion. It is not a necessary condition because so long as the gap between 
the marginal product of labor and the subsistence needs of labor is relatively 
large, serfdom may obtain even though free land may have disappeared, as 
happened in the Russian Ukraine in the eighteenth century.42 Nor is it a 
sufficient condition because - as will be seen in detail below - land 
abundance may result in a small free peasantry.43 In either case, state 
intervention in some form will be required to enforce property rights system 
on laborers. However, what share of the actual coercion required to enforce a 
form of labor coercion is applied by private and public agents is not clear. 
The particular case being examined here suggests that much of the actual 
coercion necessary to enslave American Indians was applied by private 
entrepreneurs, state sanction being merely formal. Domar suggested that in the 
case of serfdom the state must intervene to abolish the right of laborers to 
move by tying laborers to landowners, which causes competition among employers 
44to cease. However, what share of the necessary coercion is privately 
applied and what share is applied by the government is again unclear. Finally, 
under land abundance, the peasantry arises because the state intervenes to 
preserve the right of the laborers to move, causing competition to persist. In 
this case, Domar asserts, even if the state restricts the right to own land to 
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a certain group of individuals, so long as competition is not restricted, land 
abundance will result in a class of landowners and a class of free wage 
laborers or a class of sharecroppers, not in labor coercion. 45 How much 
coercion the state is willing to apply we will assume will depend on the rate 
of return to the state on the application of coercion. 
2. Examining the African experience, Thomas and Bean noticed a clear 
link between slave hunting and depopulation. They suggested that enslaving was 
analogous to fishing in an open access fisheries and that depopulation could 
be likened to the depletion of fish stocks that ensues in that case, the 
classic problem studied by the economic theory of common property 
resources. 46 It may be reasonable to think, therefore, that the indigenous 
depopulation that accompanied Spanish enslavement of American Indians may be 
similarly consistent with the theory of common property resources, and that it 
may be attributed in part to the same causes. Moreover, if the consequences of 
enslaving are consistent with what the theory of common property reso~rces 
predicts will happen to commonly owned resources, it is reasonable to think 
that observed responses to the over-exploitation of a common property resource 
like labor may be similarly consistent with policy measures which economists 
specializing in natural resource management recommend to prevent depletion of 
the resource and dissipation of its rents. The congregacion, encomiendas, and 
mandamientos, therefore, could be viewed in this light. One may expect the 
encomiendas and mandamientos, in particular to have a dual aim, one, resource 
conservation and, two, appropriation of the resource's rent. Finally, it is 
similarly reasonable to think that the chosen policies' prospective success or 
failure may be analyzed ex ante in terms of the same theory. 
3. Consider now the free peasantry.47 Its rise may be accounted for in 
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terms of a simplified model which captures the essential characteristics of 
the scenario we are considering I the extreme scarcity of labor relative to 
land. For simplicity we may imagine that labor is homogeneous and property 
rights on labor have emerged and are vested on the laborers themselves. Landi 
on the other hand I is infinitely abundanti equally fertile everywhere I and 
initially unowned. The model mayor may not abstract from capital. In either 
case , the abundance of land reduces the number of factors by one so that the 
model will, in effect, be a one or a two factor model, respectively. 
Assume for the moment that the only two factors of production are labor 
and land. scarce, labor will fetch a ; being abundanti land will 
not fetch a I nor will it earn rent provided we abstract from locationalI 
advantages. Under these conditions and so long as private property rightsI 
are well defined and enforced, a free , small peasantry will arise. This result 
follows from implicit assumptions about the nature of the technology of 
production and of property rights delineation and enforcement: for reasons 
that Ricardo elucidated years ago, given that land is both evenly fertile and 
abundant in supply, the marginal product of labor will be constant and equal 
to its average producti the production function will therefore be a straight 
line out of the origin and the labor demand curve derived from it will be 
horizontal. Under these conditions I how much output is produced will be a 
function of the supply of labor. Output will increase or decrease as the labor 
supply of labor curve shifts to the right or the left. Techniques of 
production will -since labor is the scarce factor and land the abundant one­
economize on the use of labor but not on the use of land. That is, given the 
labor supply and technologically determined labor/land ratios , land inputs 
will be automatically determined. 
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Since the marginal product of labor equals the average product and given 
that competition equates them both to the wage rate, total output will equal 
the wage bill and all output will accrue to the laborers themselves. If labor 
and land are complementary in production, by the same logic that we envision 
all final output belonging to the laborers, we can envision the laborers 
holding the land they cultivate in private property. Although techniques of 
production will tend to be land intensive, peasants will have no incentive to 
accumulate more land than they can work alone or with the help of their 
families. In addition to being owned by those who work them, therefore, farms 
will tend to be small and fairly equal in size. The nature of property rights 
on labor determine the land tenure system, not the other way around. 
For as long as land remains abundant land rent will be zero. Land 
owners, therefore, will not hire laborers, nor will laborers hire themselves 
out to landowners for less than they can earn working land of their own, which 
under the assumed conditions they can readily obtain; consequently, land will 
be worked by individual proprietors without the help of hired labor. Since we 
are abstracting from locational advantages, locational rents will not arise, 
nor will a market in land. Neither would we expect to observe a wage labor 
force or share cropping, since both presuppose that land has become scarce. 
Property rights on commodities will be vested on the laborers, and the 
exchange of commodities, if it exists, will take place according to their 
labor content. The same goes for the means of production. Thus, although 
private property in land has arisen, so long as land remains abundant exchange 
proceeds as Smith had visualized it in his "early and rude" state of society 
preceding stock accumulation and land appropriation. 48 The number of peasant 
holdings will grow with the peasant population which, ceteris paribus, may be 
I 
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expected to be a direct function of the difference between peasant output and 
the peasantry's subsistence requirements, among other variables. 
The preceding results clearly depend on property rights being enforced 
at zero cost. In reality, however, enforcing property rights is costly and, in 
particular, requires that coercion be applied. In all but the simpler 
societies the coercion necessary for the enforcement of property rights 
requires a state, whose degree of complexity will vary with the nature of the 
property rights system. Without enforcement by the state the free peasantry 
that will arise in response to free competition and land abundance is not 
likely to persist, no matter how violence potential is distributed among 
peasants. An uneven distribution of coercive capabilities among the peasants 
may lead some of them to attempt to enslave or enserf others, for the purpose 
of appropriating some portion of the difference between the marginal product 
of labor and the subsistence requirements of labor. Should the distribution 
of coercive capabilities among the peasants be initially equal it will tend to 
become unequal, because incentives will exist for peasants to innovate the 
technology of coercion for the purpose of appropriating some of the labor 
rents of those that do not. 
Whether the social structure that will arise to apply the coercion 
required to defend property rights under conditions of land abundance will be 
a predatory or a contract state, however, is not clear. Early political 
philosophers like Locke thought that land abundance would lead to a small 
peasantry and a representative democracy. On the other hand, we have already 
made reference to modern anthropological evidence from Amazonia which suggests 
that -while land abundance does tend to yield something akin to a small 
peasantry- only very simple forms of political organization tend to arise in 
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such a setting. Forms of political organization sufficiently complex to be 
called a state tend to arise only when land becomes comparatively scarce, to 
exclude others from the scarce land. In their more advanced expressions these 
tend to resemble predatory states rather than contract states. Whatever form 
of state arises, the state may be supported from revenues levied on labor 
income but not on land rent. 
4. Assume now that land is of uneven fertility or alternatively, that 
while being evenly fertile it is not infinitely abundant. In fact, both 
instances are equivalent, as Wicksteed first demonstrated. Let us preserve the 
distinction for expository purposes. Should land be unevenly fertile, 
intramarginal land will yield rent, which may be taxed to protect property 
rights on land up to the margin. Extramarginal land remains unowned. 
Population growth in a closed economy context where land is evenly 
fertile will eventually lead to land scarcity. Alternatively, in an open 
economy context land scarcity may result from population growth or from an 
increase in foreign demand for land intensive goods that raises their prices 
and causes land rent to appear. There will now be reasons for landlords to 
hire laborers or for share cropping to arise rather than to coerce labor, but 
again, whether or not competitive conditions prevail will depend on the state, 
which even here could reduce labor mobility if the difference between the 
marginal product of labor and the subsistence requirement of laborers are 
large enough. 
III. Interpreting the evidence 
1. One can gain insight into the initial conditions Spaniards 
encountered by recalling that abundant, evenly fertile land yielding no rent 
/ 
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leads to a peasantry, and that differentially fertile land yielding rent leads 
to greater differentiation in the social and political structure. Analogously, 
under conditions of land abundance such as obtain in the Amazonian forests, 
population growth leads to competition that can be resolved fairly peacefully 
by the spread of small population groups throughout the available forest land, 
for reasons similar to those discussed above. Abundant resources earn no rent 
and, therefore, do not justify defining property rights, defending these 
rights, or resolving disputes over them, which will tend not to arise anyway. 
Groups need not compete militarily or otherwise for the abundant resource. 
Thus, land abundance and the associated lack of competition will reduce the 
need for a military and a legal apparatus aimed at protecting property rights 
and resolving disputes between competing claimants to them. The virtual 
absence of the state observed under these conditions is consistent with the 
findings of game theory that IIwealth maximizing individuals will usually find 
it worthwhile to cooperate with other players when the play is repeated, when 
they possess complete information about other players' past performance, and 
when there are small numbers of players. 1149 That wars -to the extent they 
exist- should be waged for the capture of slaves and wives would appear to be 
consistent with the fact that labor is relatively scarce relative to land. 
Incentives exist for more complex forms of state and, consequently, 
taxation, to arise where a)land is not evenly fertile everywhere and, 
therefore, may be said to yield a differential rent over which competition 
arises, and which requires exclusion to prevent the resource from being 
overused and the rents it would otherwise yield to be dissipated, or b)where 
land is of even quality but the growth of population has given rise to 
locational rents. Evidently, a)applies to communities that had settled on the 
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varzeas, such as the Carios. Access to varzeas may be purchased with valuable 
goods, slaves, or labor services, in which case we would expect trade and 
labor coercion to be known to indigenous dwellers of varzeas and forests. 
Pre-columbian Paraguay may be viewed as a particular case of the varzea­
forest setting described above. 
2. Such a varzea-forest setting as was just described was precisely the 
setting on which mercantilist Spanish colonization of Paraguay imposed itself. 
Generally regarded until recently as a system of government intervention to 
artificially create balance of trade surpluses, mercantilism is again being 
thought nowadays as the fiscal system of predatory states which -unconstrained 
by their constituents- freely use their discriminating monopolist position to 
raise revenue by selling rent creating regulation at prices reflecting their 
ability to price discriminate among regulation demanders. The theory of the 
single ruler, revenue maximizing, predatory state is put forth by North. 50 An 
application cast in rent-seeking terms is Baysinger, Tollison and Ekelund's 
analysis of French and British mercantilism. Spanish mercantilism may be 
viewed in similar fashion. 
Isabel and Ferdinand's de facto appropriation of the natural and labor 
resources of America by right of conquest was lawfully sanctioned by a Papal 
bull, which the crown obtained by assuming the Church's responsibility of 
converting the aboriginal Americans to Catholicism. 51 As their proprietor, 
the crown could utilize those assets for its own profit, i.e., it could try to 
maximize the discounted future stream of net income that they could yield. To 
that effect the crown could assume the risks of conquering, colonizing, and 
exploiting the resources, to that effect hiring individuals under a wage 
contract, monitoring their activities, and so on. Alternatively, the crown 
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could cede its rights over these resources to private entrepreneurs in 
exchange for either a lump sum payment or a share of the profits that they 
would derive from exploiting them. Whether or not it did so would depend on 
the crown's attitude towards risk, its access to information about conquest 
opportunities vis-a-vis those of individuals, and its~ability to monitor 
agents. Even if conquistadors were subject to greater risk than the crown, 
under information assymmetry and costly monitoring, it would have been in the 
crown's interest to share profits with conquistadors rather than employing 
them under a salary contract or selling off conquest rights to them for a lump 
sum payment. That is, it would have been in the crown's interest to choose to 
share profits with conquistadors if the latter could obtain information about 
conquest opportunities relatively more effectively than the Crown, and if 
crown monitoring of its agents' actions were comparatively costly. It has also 
been argued that " (r)iskiness to conquistadors would have made it irrational 
for the crown to sell off conquest rights for a lump-sum payment and not share 
in the returns, assuming the returns are sufficiently detectable. 1152 
The conquest and colonization of America, therefore, may be seen as a 
joint venture between the Spanish state and private entrepreneurs. To make it 
worthwhile for private entrepreneurs to risk their resources in pursuit of 
royal ends of discovery, conquest, and colonization the crown establishing a 
system of incentives that permitted the individuals in question to obtain a 
portion of the rents that these resources could produce. The crown's share 
usually took the form of a tax payment, which in the case of mineral ores was 
the royal fifth, twenty per cent of the refined metal. Crown associates 
obtained the residual. 
The expected rate of return of investment was higher in the more densely 
27 
populated highlands of Mexico and Peru, because there lay deposits of precious 
metals in scarce supply in Europe, a relatively large indigenous population 
with a highly evolved division of labor, a relatively high agricultural and 
artisanal labor productivity, and systems of public finance and labor coercion 
that had supported fairly large state and religious bureaucracies before 
Columbus and which were easily adapted to Spanish aims. 
In the American lowlands, on the other hand, there appeared to be no 
deposits of precious metals and, while land was abundant, the indigenous 
population was sparse, its labor productivity was comparatively much lower 
and, consequently, population groups were much smaller, nomadic or 
semi-nomadic, and more thinly spread. Taxation could produce sufficient 
revenues to sustain only a very simple form of state and religious 
organization, and revenues could not increase without substantial -and, 
therefore, costly- modification of indigenous social structures. 
Under these circumstances one would have expected privately and publicly 
owned resources to flow towards the highlands and away from the lowlands, 
which is what in fact happened. However, to defend the more profitable areas 
of its domains from encroachment by competing rivals, both indigenous and 
European, Spain needed to settle the frontier areas and had to offer its 
agents sufficient incentives to induce them to do so. In the frontier region 
we are considering there were no precious metals, land was relatively 
abundant, and the relatively scarce resource was the indigenous labor forcei 
Consequently, land had little or no value, only labor could, in general, 
produce rents. S3 Therefore, some system of property rights on the scarce 
factor labor had to be designed to allow part of the rents that would have 
accrued to indigenous laborers if these had remained free to be channeled 
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towards the crown's peninsular vassals. Thus, inducing Spanish colonists to 
remain in the frontiers implied some form of labor market regulation by 
coercion, since only by curtailing labor mobility could the wage rate and the 
marginal product of labor be made to diverge and the difference could be 
appropriated by non-laborers. 
3. It is easily understandable, therefore, that the crown should have 
initially allowed indigenous enslavement to take place. The conquest itself 
had resulted in military confrontations which yielded captives that Spaniards 
and their local indigenous allies shared among themselves. Furthermore, once 
it was clear that Peru would be reached through Panama and the Pacific coast, 
it was to be expected that Spaniards in Asuncion should have turned their 
attention to enslaving American Indians, their former allies included, even if 
the slaves thus obtained could only produce goods to be consumed by the 
Spaniards locally: hopes that mines would be found in the Rio de la Plata 
area remained alive, and even if that search proved futile in the end, past 
experience suggested that an agricultural commodity for export might still be 
produced if slave labor were to be available. Finally, the tax revenues the 
crown obtained from enslavement helped support royal officials in the area and 
defend the colony. 
The enslavement of American Indians, however, had deleterious public 
finance implications which past experience elsewhere in the New World had 
already made evident to the crowni although Spaniards were supposed to pay the 
crown a head tax per indigenous slave they captured or bought from other 
indigenous people, free American Indians also owed the crown a tax for the 
protection that it presumably afforded them; American Indians were -after all­
free vassals of the crown. The negative long term effects of the enslavement­
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induced decline of the free indigenous population and the consequent shrinking 
of the potential tax basel therefore could soon be expected to offset theI 
short term public finance advantages the crown derived from indigenous 
enslavement I as it already had in regions conquered earlier. 
Thus I as the "Adelantados" (individuals the crown had authorized to 
undertake the conquest of Spanish America) completed their task the crownl 
sought -and found- ways to amend the terms of the "capitulaciones" (contracts) 
it had signed with them specifying the conditions in which the conquest would 
be conducted and the manner in which the proceeds would be divided. 
InvariablYI the crown curtailed the Adelantados l political and economic powers 
sooner or later and ultimately replaced them by salaried officers of the royal 
bureaucracy designated by the king. This political struggle was a necessary 
prelude to the economic struggle for control of the indigenous labor force l 
which hinged on imposing the encomienda. Control of land was secondary and l 
therefore l the struggle was less concerned with it. This suggests that once 
the conquest of a certain region was securedl the crown invariably sought to 
change the original distribution of rents in its favor by imposing the 
encomiendas l which achieved this aim in a manner that will become clear below. 
4. When closely looked at it becomes apparent that the encomiendas werel 
more than a system of coercively extracting indigenous labor services. 
ActuallYI they were a transaction l more specifically I a tax-farming scheme by 
which the crown exchanged royal grants of indigenous labor services for some 
form of compensation. That the encomienda was a transaction may be seen from 
the fact that its terms were clearly specified in a legally binding contract 
which was recognized by colonial courts. The crown farmed out to "worthy 
Spaniards" the right to collect for themselves in labor services the tax 
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indigenous people owed the crown and which royal officials would otherwise 
have had to collect. 54 In exchange, these encomenderos committed themselves 
to pay certain taxes to the Royal Treasury, to render military service to 
defend the colony and, in addition, to protect, convert, and acculturate their 
indigenous charges as well. 55 
The encomiendas helped the crown attain this aim as follows: as was 
already pointed out, indigenous peoples were vassals of the crown and, as 
such, deserved its protection, for which they had to pay the king a tax. 
However, in the region of concern to us American Indians were much less able 
to pay taxes than in other regions of the Spanish American empire I because of 
their comparatively lesser degree of agricultural development and practically 
non-existent commerce. While in the regions of comparatively more developed 
agriculture and trade the colonial administration could profitably tax 
indigenous production, obtaining revenues in kind and in money, in those where 
these activities were comparatively less developed the costs of collecting 
taxes in kind frequently exceeded the value of tax collections. Collecting 
taxes was an unprofitable undertaking owing to high transaction cost: local 
auction markets for agricultural produce were relatively thin l revenues in 
Ikind were perishable and the high cost of transportation by land and water 
made it difficult to transport revenues to other regions of America or to 
Spainl where they might be more advantageously auctioned off. 
Private Spanish colonists in Paraguay I on the contrary, could devote the 
output of indigenous agriculture to more profitable use than the crown. Not 
only could they consume in situ the provisions indigenous people furnished l 
but they could also raise indigenous labor productivity significantly if they 
could subject the indigenous labor force to a more disciplined work regime. 
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Output per head could increase even more if they could set indigenous laborers 
to work with iron tools, which they themselves recognized to be superior to 
stone tools and sought eagerly. By permitting serfdom to be imposed, 
therefore, both output and taxable income could be increased. 
In addition to agreeing to pay the king certain taxes, encomenderos 
committed themselves to help defend the colony against external and internal 
enemies. In this way the crown saved itself the expenses of supporting a 
specialized military force to defend the colony from external and internal 
threats, costs which given the colony's location on both the Indian and 
Portuguese frontiers, were not negligible and could be quite high. The cost 
of tax collection to the crown also decreased, since there were fewer 
encomenderos than there were indigenous tributaries. All of the functions 
encomenderos undertook to discharge were formal obligations of the Church that 
the crown had committed itself to carry out in exchange for receiving papal 
sanction to colonize the newly discovered lands. 
The encomienda, consequently, was but a particular case of tax-farming 
to which the crown resorted to increase its revenues and reduce its 
expenditures, that is, to maximize its fiscal resources. That this should have 
involved turning free vassals of the crown into serfs involved some inventive 
ideological justification, but nothing that went beyond the capabilities of 
crown ideologues. 
5. In conjunction with the congregacion, the encomiendas also served the 
purpose of reducing the depletion of indigenous labor, a scarce resource that 
Spaniards were exploiting as if it had been an abundant one because they could 
in fact regard it as a common pool resource. 
That the problem of indigenous depopulation, in so far as it was induced 
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by enslavement, can be thought of in terms of the economic theory of common 
property resources is suggested by the consistency between the observed 
phenomenon and the predictions of the theory as well as by the fact that the 
crown's attempt to cope with it involved the choice of policy measures similar 
to those favored by economists to reduce overuse of commonly owned resources. 
In the face of indigenous depopulation and its negative implications for 
public finances, the crown declared indigenous slavery illegal except in cases 
of "just wars," that is, it denied individuals the right to appropriate by 
force indigenous labor power without royal authority. In other words, the 
crown reaffirmed its property rights on the indigenous labor force. 56 
Secondly, the crown not only outlawed the damaging rancheadas, but segregated 
Spaniards and American Indians subject to the "mita,1I requiring each of them 
to live in towns of their own, apart from one another. Concomitantly, the 
crown allowed only selected individuals to obtain -for a fee- licenses 
authorizing them to use the labor services of indigenous people under 
specified conditions. 57 Only the encomenderos, the town supervisor, and the 
priest that was supposed to christianize the residents could have access to 
Indian towns. Third, by comparison to what was required of indigenous slaves, 
the crown reduced the length of time and the range of labor services that 
indigenous people subject to the mita were obliged to render to their masters 
As time went on, furthermore, the crown progressively curtailed the length of 
required labor obligations, which was reduced from around six months in mid 
sixteenth century to two month early in the seventeenth century. Thus, the 
terms of the original encomiendas, granted in mid sixteenth century, were much 
more onerous than those of the encomienda early in the seventeenth century.58 
At the same time that the congregacion reduced to towns many indigenous 
33 
communities, it also curtailed their freedom to move about. That is, it 
accomplished the double aim of protecting indigenous people from Spaniards, 
thus reducing the depopulation caused by enslavement and pathogens, and 
restricting their freedom of movement, a necessary condition for extracting 
some of the labor rents. 
Measures like the assignment of property rights on laborers to licensed 
trustees, the imposition of limits on the number of indigenous laborers that 
could be made to work at anyone time, and the appointment of "alcaldes de 
sacas" are too similar to those that would be imposed to restrict access to 
fisheries to be coincidental and r generally speakingr their stated intention 
was the same, i.e., eliminating the dissipation of rents. In this particular 
case, arrangements to reduce the dissipation of rents also aimed at making it 
possible for the state to appropriate a larger fraction of labor rents as 
well. Many of the features of the encomienda and the congregaci6n can be more 
fully appreciated when viewed in this light. 
The behavior of the indigenous population once it was confined to 
segregated towns to which unauthorized Spaniards were denied access suggests 
that enslavement may account for a portion of the variation in population. 
Though still subject to periodic bout of epidemics r it appears that the 
population of indigenous towns recovered faster the less varied and less 
onerous the labor services they were expected to render. Thus, the rate of 
decrease of the indigenous population slowed down after the indigenous people 
subject to the encomienda mitaria were confined to towns. In the Jesuit 
missions, where they were exempted from the encomienda r the indigenous 
population actually grew r even though these missions continued to have contact 
with Spaniards. 
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6. That a small mestizo peasantry should have emerged and 
eventually predominated over the forms of coerced indigenous labor that 
preceded it imply that the previously cited mechanism of coercion were not 
applied to mestizos and that, on the contrary, their rights were well defined 
and enforced. In fact, when their fathers so recognized them and the governor 
concurred, mestizos were legally exempt from the encomienda, an exception that 
the courts enforced. Due to the absence of Spanish immigration, mestizos 
actually occupied many of the positions of "criollos," Indies-born children of 
Spaniards, although public office and encomiendas continued to be 
preferentially assigned to Spaniards and criollos. Thus, following the 
original distribution of encomiendas in Asuncion, Spaniards as well as their 
mestizo offsprings left for areas to the north and east, where there were 
relatively large concentrations of still unentrusted indigenous people who 
could be subjected to the encomienda mitaria or, if they refused, enslaved. 
Once the still unentrusted population disappeared, however, the by now mostly 
mestizo population had to rely on their own labor and the still abundant land 
for a livelihood, that is, they became peasants. As the scarcity of 
indigenous laborers became even more pronounced and the encomiendas stagnated, 
encomenderos attempted to entrust mestizos but they were unsuccessful because 
mestizos were legally ineligible for subjection and the colonial courts 
enforced that exemption. Thus, it was the government's intervention to 
enforce property rights that allowed a free peasantry to remain free when 
economic forces would have led to its bonding. As the population grew and 
foreign demand for Paraguay's exports increased, following the Borbonic 
Reforms in particular, lands became scarcer, rent on land emerged, and the 
land frontier was pushed farther out by family farms. 
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IV. Is the Analysis Robust? 
Confidence that the analysis is robust may be increased in at least two 
ways. The first requires that we derive from the model refutable implications 
consistent with the historical record. The second requires that the model be 
capable of accounting for events that were not used in its construction. Let 
us consider each of these two tests. 
In the model we have presented, changes in relative prices of productive 
factors result in changes in the profitability of delineating and enforcing 
property rights over them. We saw that this notion is consistent with the fact 
that the indigenous popuplation decline, by increasing the relative price of 
labor, furnished incentives for indigenous slavery to be substituted by the 
encomienda and mandamientos. Conversely, once the population began to 
increase, the importance of labor force coercion declined and that of free 
labor increased. NOw, as the indigenous population declined and the scarcity 
of labor relative to land increased, the increase in the price of labor 
relative to land should have given rise not only to a change in the 
profitability of different property rights sets but to a change in production 
techniques as well. Those previously considered efficient should have been 
displaced by others which more intensively utilized the relatively abundant 
and, therefore, cheaper, factor. In particular, we would have expected a fall 
in the relative importance of activities that used labor relatively 
intensively and an increase in the relative importance of activities that used 
land relatively intensively. In turn, these changes should have reflected 
themselves in the structure of production and exports; goods produced by 
techniques less intensive in labor and more intensive in land should have 
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begun to predominate. As will be seen below, this is exactly what we observe. 
Until the 1570's, the economy was based exclusively on indigenous 
agriculture. Cattle raising, relatively less labor intensive than agriculture, 
was practically non-existent. All production was for local consumption. 
However, beginning in the late sixties and the early seventies, interest in 
cattle raising increased. In turn, the expansion of cattle raising was linked 
to the founding of new cities, the expansion of the regional market and, 
eventually, to the development of foreign trade. The structure of exports, 
which were initially made up mostly of cereals, sugar, and wines, began to 
change towards the early part of the seventeenth century. The early exports, 
which presuposed a relatively labor intensive agriculture, began to be 
overtaken by the 1630's by yerba mate, which did not require cultivation and 
could be harvested from trees that grew spontaneously in forests northeast of 
Asunci6n. We conclude then, that at least one implication of the model is 
consistent with the evidence. 
In addition, differences in relative labor endowments made themselves 
felt in the choice of technique and of product in different sectors of the 
yerba industry. Thus, Paraguayans, who continuously complained of the scarcity 
of indigenous labor, produced for the most part caa-vira or "yerba de palos," 
a variety that required less processing, and never developed yerba mate 
plantations. The jesuit missions, however, where the labor was more abundant, 
were known for producing a variety of yerba that required more labor intensive 
processing (caa-miri), and also developed plantations. 
The analysis must also be able to account in terms of the model for 
features of Paraguay's colonial economy other than those so far described. At 
least two such instances may be mentioned. First, that on the one hand, as 
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the encomiendas stagnated early in the seventeenth century, the crown should 
have exempted the Jesuit missions from the encomiendas and should have refused 
several requests by encomenderos to cancel that exemption, while in the late 
eighteenth century it should have expelled the missionaries; and second, that 
in the eighteenth century, as population grew, land rents appeared, and 
foreign trade increased, the crown should have granted no new encomiendas, 
should have retaken possession of those whose terms had ended, and should have 
substituted the militia by a semi-professional army paid for out of revenues 
derived from taxation of foreign trade and land rents. Let me take these two 
instances one at a time. 
The indigenous population of Jesuit mission towns grew rapidly from 
their inception. By contrast, that of Franciscan missions did not begin to 
grow until the mid-18th century and then only very slowly. Furthermore, under 
the direction of their Jesuit mentors, the missions contributed effectively to 
defense and, in addition, paid their taxes in money, punctually to boot. When 
indigenous people were congregated in missions under Jesuit oversight, 
segregated from Spaniards, and exempted from the encomienda, the stock of 
indigenous labor yielded much higher returns than it did when confined to 
towns founded by Franciscans, less isolated from Spaniards, and subjected to 
the encomienda. The crown had no reason, then, to yield to encomenderos and 
reimpose the encomienda on indigenous dwellers of Jesuit missions, and did 
not. 59 On the other hand, when the crown was able to resolve boundary 
problems it had with its Portuguese neighbor to the east, the Jesuit missions' 
usefulness was decreased. It is perhaps no accident that few years separated 
the expulsion of the Jesuits and the signing of the Treaty of San Ildefonso 
between Spain and Portugal, which settled the frontiers in the area under 
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discussion. Clearly, however, the crown's decision to expel the Jesuits from 
its domains may not alone, perhaps not even principally, be attributed to 
decreased defense needs. 
Second, in a period of rising wages, as the crown granted no new 
encomiendas, reclaimed the encomiendas it has leased out, and put the 
remaining indigenous population to work in state enterprises, the 
encomenderos' contribution to defense decreased and the crown's share of 
defense duties increased concomitantly. Therefore, a new military organization 
had to replace the old; furthermore, the system by which the colonial 
administration obtained contributions to defense from individuals in exchange 
for grants of labor was scrapped. In its stead, by the military reform of l80l 
the crown created a semi-professional army remunerated mostly in money, not in 
labor, in land, or both. 
For the above reasons, private encomiendas declined but they persisted 
for nearly as long as Spanish rule lasted. That it may have lingered on beyond 
its formal abolition in l803 is suggested by the fact that when Paraguayans 
declared independence, one of their first measures was to reiterate that the 
encomiendas had been abolished, a measure by which they hoped to eliminate 
privileges as well as to increase the supply of labor and slow down wage 
increases, even if only slightly. 
v. Conclusions 
The previous description and analysis suggest that the case considered 
was but a particular instance of mercantilist regulation of a labor market. 
The state maximized fiscal revenues creating economic rents through 
regulation. It defended the property rights that created these rents investing 
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resources with an eye to how high a rate of return they were expected to 
obtain. Whether slavery or serfdom arose hinged on the degree to which the 
state enforced property rights, which in turn depended on the rate of return 
that activity was expected to yield to the state as compared to others. 
Indigenous slavery emerged when the single-ruler, revenue-maximizing, 
predatory mercantilist state, in order to provide incentives for private 
agents to settle this poor frontier colony, did not enforce its private 
property rights over the labor of indigenous people and allowed them to be 
regarded as a common property resource. Exploitation by private entrepreneurs 
of crown-owned indigenous labor along common property resource lines led to 
the depletion of the resource and the dissipation of rents that should have 
accrued to the crown. As the resource became more scarce and, therefore, more 
valuable, and to prevent further depletion and rent dissipation, the crown 
sought to regulate the exploitation of Indian labor by means of the encomienda 
and the congregacion. These regulatory institutions were similar to schemes 
for managing open access fisheries. They were intended to curtail access to 
the resource and reduce the dissipation of the rents it could yield to the 
crown. However, the system did not work well until it became clear that 
indigenous people could better contribute to colonial defense and crown 
coffers more when gathered in Jesuit missions than when entrusted to 
encomenderos. Only then were they exempted from the encomiendas. The growth 
of the mestizo population legally exempt from the encomiendas in time made 
labor relatively more abundant and land comparatively more scarce, a tendency 
that was exacerbated when the Borbonic reforms increased foreign trade and 
immigration. As land and foreign trade replaced labor as the state's 
predominant source of tax revenues, the crown abandoned the encomiendas in 
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favor of other institutional arrangements by which the state sought to provide 
defense and obtain revenues. The systems of indigenous labor coercion were 
nothing but mercantilism's system of monopolies as they applied to the labor 
market. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. The name yanacona came to Paraguay with some of the men who escaped the 
repression that followed Pizarro's revolts in Peru, and was used in the early 
years of the colonial period. It later yielded to the term "originario," which 
was used to refer to American Indians "outside their town of origin." Mita comes 
from "mit' a," quechua for "turn." "Mandamiento," (from mandar = to send, to 
order) was known as coatequitl, alquilaje, or repartimientos in other regions of 
the Spanish American Empire. See Garavaglia, Mercado Interno y Economia Colonial, 
pp. 272 and 303) . 
2.See Carneiro, "A Theory of the Origins of the State." References to the link 
between relative land scarcity, property rights on land and labor, and the 
financing of the state in Mexico may be found in Caso, "Land Tenure Among the 
Ancient Mexicans" and Florescano, Estructura y Problemas Agrarios de Mexico, 
=;..:..;:::........:==-=. For Peru see Ramirez, "Indian and Spanish Conceptions of Land Tenure 
in Peru, 1500-1800." 
3.As far as the early polygamy of Spaniards is concerned, documents of the period 
speak of each Spaniard having an average of 10 to 14 indigenous wives and 
characterize the scenario as "Mohammed's Paradise." See Susnik, EI indio colonial 
del Paraguay Vol. I and, for the significance of exogamy to indigenous peoples 
of the area, Clastres, "Independence et exogamie: structure et dynamique des 
societes indiennes de la foret tropicale." 
4. (from the Spanish, "cufiado,a" = brother, sister in-law. 
5.For the resistance by the Guarani see Susnik, ibid., C. Pastore, La lucha por 
la tierra en el Paraguay, and Necker, "La reaction des Indiens Guarani A la 
Conquete espagnole du Paraguay," and Indiens Guarani et Chamanes franciscains. 
6. Susnik, EI indio colonial, vol. I). 
7.See Rivarola Paoli, La economia colonial, p.91 
8.See Necker, "La reaction .. " and Indiens Guarani .. for a chronology of Indian 
uprisings against Spanish attempts to impose slavery and the encomiendas. 
9.Enslavement had particularly pronounced depopulating effects because slave 
hunters sought women in particular and drastically altered the sex ratio of the 
indigenous communities affected. 
10.See Susnik, EI indio colonial, vol. I. 
11.An encomienda was a temporary grant of specified, restricted labor services; 
it was not a land grant, nor did it necessarily imply a separate (simultaneous 
or subsequent) such grant. In fact, the most profitable use of encomienda labor 
did not require the ownership of any land at all. Encomenderos could use the 
indigenous laborers they were assigned to extract yerba mate from royally owned 
land by paying a fee for the privilege of so doing. In general, however, output 
cannot be produced with labor alone and, therefore, encomenderos also tended to 
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receive grants of land, but as a result of a separate grant. 
12.0n the congregacion see Ots Capdequi, Instituciones sociales de la America 
Espanola en el periodo colonial, pp.62-69). 
13. The privileges of the indigenous hierarchy included exemption from the 
tribute. 
14.See Pastore La lucha .. and Susnik El indio colonial ... 
15. For the early founding of Indian towns by private Spaniards, see Azara (1847). 
Typically, Franciscan missionaries would found a town and, after a period of time 
leave it in the hands of a member of the secular priesthood, to go found another 
town elsewhere. Margarita Duran Estrago, Presencia Franciscana en el Paraguay: 
1538-1824, pp. 93-164. 
16.Silvio Zavala, Origenes de la colonizacion en el Rio de la Plata 
17.See Juan Carlos Garavaglia, Mercado interno y economia colonial, p. 309. 
18.See Velazquez, "Caracteres de la encomienda paraguaya en los siglos XVII y 
XVI I," p. 143) . 
19.James S. Saeger, "Survival and Abolition: The Eighteenth Century Paraguayan 
Encomienda" p. 74. 
20.Adalberto Lopez, "Shipbuilding in Sixteenth Century Asuncion del Paraguay," 
quotes sources suggesting that the indigenous population was reduced to one tenth 
of its original numbers by the early sixteenth century. The most conservative 
estimate is given by Juan Carlos Garavaglia, Mercado interno y economia colonial, 
who suggests a fifty percent reduction. 
21.For the ordinances see Julio Cesar Chaves, "Las ordenanzas de Ramirez de 
Velasco, Hernandarias, y Alfaro," pp. 107-120. 
22.For the funding of the first Spanish towns and Jesuit missions in the Guayra 
see Ramon I. Cardozo, La antiqua Provincia del Guaira y Villa Rica del Espiritu 
Santo. 
23.See Garavaglia, Economia, sociedad, y regiones, p.141) 
24.Alberto Armani, Ciudad de Dios y Ciudad del Sol. El "estado" Jesuita de los 
guaranies (1609-1769). 
25. See Thomas de Kruger, "Asuncion y su area de influencia en la epoca colonial, " 
p. 41) . 
26.See Juan Carlos Garavaglia, Mercado interno y economia colonial pp. 353-379, 
and Economia, sociedad y regiones pp. 193-260. Also, Jerry W. Cooney, "The 
Yerba-Mate and Cattle Frontier of Paraguay, 1776-1811: Social, Economic, and 
Political Impact," and "Bureaucrats, Growers, and Defense: The Royal Tobacco 
Monopoly of Paraguay. II For the late eighteenth century boom see Jerry W. Cooney, 
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"An Ignored Aspect of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata." 
27.Direct evidence of the appearance of land rents can first be found around the 
1780's. 
28. See Rene Ferrer de Arrellaga, Un siglo de exnanSl.on colonizadora: los 
origenes de Concepcion for internal migration; Jerry Cooney, "Foreigners in the 
Intendencia of Paraguay," for the -by local standards- relatively large 
immigration that was observed. 
29. For some of the state enterprises see Jerry W. Cooney, "A Colonial Naval 
Induatry: The Fabrica de Cables of Paraguay," and "Paraguayan Astilleros and the 
Platine Merchant Marine, 1796-1806," and for the escheating of the encomienda to 
the crown see Saeger, "Survival and Abolition ... ," pp. 77. 
30.For the 1848 dissolution of Indian towns by the state see Carlos Pastore, La 
lucha por la tierra en el Paraguay, pp. 127-132. 
31.See Coase, Ronald, "The Problem of Social Cost." 
32.For the argument that resources will be overexploited see H. Scott Gordon, 
"The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery." For the 
argument that dissipation will occur along many margins see Cheung, Steven N.S. 
"The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource." 
33. See Harold Demsetz, IITowards a Theory of Property Rights, " and A. Alchian and 
H. Demsetz, "The Property Rights Paradigm." 
34. For the original statement regarding the importance of measurement in 
delineating and enforcing property rights see Yoram Barzel, "Measurement Costs 
and the Organization of Markets." 
35. See Douglass C. North and Robert P. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World, Ch. 
3. 
36.Conspicuous consumption may be said to be an alternative motive for demanding 
slaves, but it has been found to be an unimportant factor in the antebellum U.S. 
South. See A. Conrad and J.R. Meyer, The Economics of Slavery and Other Studies 
in Econometric History and Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman, The 
Reinterpretation of American Economic History, pp. 311-341. 
37 . Laborers tied to the land are less mobile than slaves. Therefore, slavery can 
be more efficient than systems of labor coercion that tie the laborer to the 
land. See Robert Evans, Jr., "Some Notes on Coerced Labor." Other possible ways 
of curtailing labor mobility include, for example, the military draft, 
impediments to the free flow of individuals through national borders, and 
restriction on settlement outside of specified areas, such as the homelands of 
South Africa. 
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